Nowadays, the Interac e-Transfer is one of the most important remote payment methods for Canadian consumers. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the very first to examine the privacy and security of Interac e-Transfers. Experimental results show that the notifications sent to customers via email and SMS contain sensitive private information that can potentially be observed by third parties. Anyone with illegitimate intent can use this information to carry out attacks, including the fraudulent redirection of Standard e-Transfers. A recent news article supports this finding. Improvements to overcome these interconnected privacy and security problems are proposed and discussed.
Introduction
Since its introduction in 2002, the steady growth of Interac e-Transfer volume has made it the third most frequently used remote payment method for Canadian consumers, finally overtaking its biggest rival in the field, paper & cheques (CertaPay Inc., 2002; Tompkins and Galociova, 2018; Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2019a) . Including business transactions, more than 371 million Interac e-Transfers were performed in 2018, a total value of more than CAD 132 billion. Moreover, the majority of Canadians (57 %) and actually 4 out of 5 Canadian online banking users are registered for the service at one of the 257 currently participating financial institutions (Interac Corp., 2018a; Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2019b) .
Clearly, such an important financial transfer system has to maintain the security and privacy of its transactions in order to mitigate the risk of fraud and disclosure of its users' private financial information. The Interac Corporation claims that "Interac e-Transfer users are protected with multiple layers of security, making the service one of the most secure money transfer services globally" (Interac Corp., 2018b) . Additionally, the system allegedly "requires no bank account information, and no personal financial information of any kind, to move money between people or businesses" (Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2017b).
Regarding these claims, the authors of this report were surprised to notice in their everyday banking that recipients and senders of Interac e-Transfers are notified by emails containing information about the senders' and recipients' names, financial institutions and transferred amounts. To our even greater bewilderment, recipients of Interac e-Transfers are authenticated by often user-defined security questions. Hereby some senders choose easily answerable questions as "Where do I live?" or worse "What is my name?", which obviously should not be possible in a secure money transfer service or, more generally, an online banking environment. Based on this we conducted a first ad-hoc experiment successfully depositing CAD 0.1 in an account whose owner's legal name was not related to the specified addressee.
The above observations finally led to the following research questions. Question 1: Under which circumstances can Interac e-transfers be hijacked (redirected)? Question 2: In which way are Interac e-Transfer security questions insecure? Question 3: Do the recently introduced Autodeposit and Request Money features increase security and/or do they create new issues? Question 4: What can potential adversaries learn from email or SMS notifications? Question 5: How can the learned information be misused for more sophisticated attacks? Question 6: What are the reasons for the potential security and privacy problems we found, i.e. why has the system been designed as it is today? To answer these questions, we have designed and performed two experiments in the form of two series of Interac e-Transfers.
To the best of our knowledge, there was no -at least not publicly available -prior research of potential security and privacy problems regarding the Interac e-Transfer platform. Therefore, this paper firstly qualifies and quantifies these problems based on the analysis of our experimental results and publicly available information about the system. Because of research restraints and time limits (see section 3.1), our results -especially regarding the security problems -have to be seen as preliminary conclusions (see section 5).
Secondly, this paper proposes improvements to the Interac e-Transfer platform to address the identified problems. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
The next section (2) will give further necessary background information regarding the Interac e-Transfer platform and will briefly consider related work. Section 3 continues with a description of the performed experiments and a detailed analysis of the results regarding security and privacy of the system. In addition, further observations about the system are described and explained before possible improvements are discussed. An evaluation of the results and proposed improvements follow in Section 4. We discuss contributions and conclude in Section 5, also outlining future research. Finally, Section 6 gives information about our discussion with Interac regarding the results of this research.
An extended version of this paper that includes additional details and discussion can soon be found at https://arxiv.org/.
Background and Related Work

Types of Interac e-Transfers
The Interac e-Transfer platform differentiates between three types of e-Transfers for consumers (Interac Corp., 2018a): 1. The original Interac e-Transfer (Standard e-Transfer) requires a manual selection of the financial institution and account into which transferred funds shall be deposited. The sender specifies a security question which the recipient must correctly answer to deposit the funds (verification of legitimacy).
The Interac e-Transfer Autodeposit
(Autodeposit e-Transfer) is similar to the Standard e-Transfer but the recipient address is associated with a single bank account. Thus, the funds are automatically deposited, and a security question is not required.
An Interac e-Transfer Request Money
(Request Money e-Transfer) can be regarded as requesting the initiation of a one-time ad-hoc Autodeposit: the recipient authorizes the request the sender sent which directly deposits the requested amount in the account specified by the sender. A security question is not required.
The Interac e-Transfer Platform Architecture
Figure 1 presents a high-level view of the Interac e-Transfer platform architecture, which is described in the following paragraphs. As the previous sections show, Interac e-Transfers allow for transferring funds between customer accounts at Canadian financial institutions. The customers hereby mainly interact with their own financial institution via online or mobile banking. The Interac Corp. acts as a Central Clearing Facility which transfers the funds via sending and receiving them to and from trust accounts (suspense accounts) at the respective financial institutions (Interac Corp., 2019a, sec. How It Works) . This means that the funds are instantly deducted from the sender's account when a transfer is started and that they are also instantly available in the recipient's account when the transfer is successfully completed. Therefore funds are transferred with only slight delays (up to 30 minutes) within what is called "a private, real-time clearing network" (Fleishman and Fuerstenberg, 2002, p. 7; Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2017b) . The daily settling of fund differences in the trust accounts is nowadays technically performed via the Canadian Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) (Fleishman and Fuerstenberg, 2002, p. 9; Interac Corp., 2019a, sec. How It Works) .
From the perspective of the participating financial institutions (participants), the Interac Corp. not only acts as a Central Clearing Facility but also as an Application Service Provider (ASP) for Interac e-Transfers:
the required functionalities are integrated into the participants' online and mobile banking services via an XML-based interface. Amongst other things, the Interac Corp. sends e-Transferrelated notification emails or SMS text messages to the participants' customers, which, where necessary, contain a customized link to the customer's preferred financial institution and/or to the Interac e-Transfer web site where one can choose from all participating financial institutions (Fleishman and Fuerstenberg, 2002; Interac Corp., 2019a, sec. How It Works) . The links transfer to the respective financial institution's login page. Figure 2 gives an overview of the different interfaces being used in the Interac e-Transfer platform architecture.
According to Interac, the Interac e-Transfer platform has layers of security and fraud protection in place, but due to these being their confidential intellectual property, the authors of this paper have no insight into this and so they are neither described nor shown here (Interac Corp., 2018b , 2019a Vaughan, 2019) . However, this paper does not consider the backend of the platform but focuses on other parts as described in section 3.1. Therefore, we only consider whether these layers of security are sufficient to maintain security with respect to the experiments we performed. Additionally, the authors had to rely solely on publicly available information about the system. With regard to this, Interac claims that the patent describing the internal workings of the system is "outdated" (Vaughan, 2019). In this regard, we believe it is likely that the system has been revised since its introduction and that, for example, (new) layers of security have been added. However, we also believe that the main architecture described here has not changed. This view seems to be confirmed by recent descriptions of the system (Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2017b; Interac Corp., 2019a).
Related Work
Databases indexing scientific publications and general-purpose search engines yield almost no results when searching for terms like "Interac e-Transfer", "Email money transfer", "CertaPay", "Acxsys" etc. The rare results are based on brief references to the system and/or do not discuss its security and privacy in detail (Ramos, 2002; Lacoursière, 2007; Moslehpour and Azhar, 2014, pp. 46-47; Tompkins and Olivares, 2016; Henry, Huynh and Welte, 2018; Tompkins and Galociova, 2018) .
Other work examined the security and privacy of PayPal and the leakage of purchase details from merchants to PayPal (Sahut, 2008; Preibusch et al., 2016) . PayPal, however, uses different means to authenticate previously unknown recipients so that the results are not 1-to-1 transferable to the Interac e-Transfer platform. Cash App (formerly Square Cash) was not the subject of a published research regarding its security and privacy to the best of our knowledge. Its feature called $cashtag, however, is similar to an improvement suggested in section 3.7.
Thus, this paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to analyse the security and privacy of Interac e-Transfers and to propose improvements.
The potential value of this contribution is emphasized by the existence of a pending patent assigned to the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) . It explicitly refers to the Interac e-Transfer platform when stating that emails are by default an insecure method of communication as they can be intercepted and forged. It also contains the criticism that security questions may in certain cases be a weak verification method (Lau et al., 2018, p. 2) . The patent's solution approach is very promising at first sight, but it only addresses certain parts of the problem as, for example, it does not consider privacy issues.
On the Security and Privacy of Interac e-Transfers
Scope and Boundaries of This Project
This paper focuses on certain parts and services of the Interac e-Transfer platform: -The paper considers the part of the Interac e-Transfer platform which is based on internet and mobile services, especially the notification messages being sent via email and SMS. It also considers certain aspects of the financial institutes' website user interfaces. Backend parts of the system, such as the LVTS as well as the interfaces between the financial institutions and the Interac Corp. are not considered. -International Interac e-Transfers (Interac Association/Acxsys Corporation, 2017a) and special features for businesses (Interac Corp., 2019b) are out of this paper's scope. -The paper does not consider possible legal requirements, e.g. regarding the information contained in notifications. -The cryptographic security of e.g. Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections to the financial institutes' website user interfaces or TLS connections for email delivery are considered to be a given requirement. An exception to this is discussed in section 3.2.
Prerequisite Observations and Related Assumptions
TLS encryption between email servers ensures that emails cannot be eavesdropped in transit. In many cases, however, emails can likely still be eavesdropped for various reasons:
-Although the Google Transparency Report suggests that the general percentage of TLS encrypted email transfers significantly increased over the past five years (Google, 2019), this does not apply to all email providers (see extended version of this report for details).
-Certain sources also indicate that intelligence agencies such as the NSA might have means to also eavesdrop on TLS encrypted connections (Schneier, 2013, secs 2 & 5; Checkoway et al., 2014) . -Whenever emails are received at a target device (computer, mobile phone, server…), they are readable in plain text unless they are encrypted via end-to-end encryption and stored in their encrypted form, which the notification emails for Interac e-Transfers are not. That means that malicious software running on the target device, having access to its stored emails, can read their contents (Zhang et al., 2017) . Therefore, even emails which are sent to an email provider supporting TLS will be potentially readable by malicious software on the target device. The same applies for SMS messages which are encrypted in transit but also potentially readable by malicious software on the target device (Abualola et al., 2016) .
Therefore, this paper considers all information which is directly contained in Interac e-Transfer related notifications (SMS/email) or linked therein (web page without login) as potentially observable.
Based on these observations the remainder of this paper assumes different types of notification readers, respectively eavesdroppers (adversaries), which also have different levels of strength: 1. Intended recipients and senders: might also learn unintentionally disclosed information about the other party. 2. Unintended recipients/observers: might receive emails when wrong email/mobile phone number is used or might observe emails as part of their work (e.g. system administrator). 3. Criminal individuals: might, for example, target an unsecured email server or several devices of end consumers using malicious software. 4. Criminal organizations/groups: might, for example, target several email servers or many target devices with malicious software. 5. Intelligence agencies: might target badly and well secured network devices (internet backend) to eavesdrop on unencrypted or encrypted email transfers -with different levels of probability, effort and success. Can also utilize the same methods as criminal organizations/groups.
Experiment-Based Privacy Analysis 3.3.1. Definition of Privacy
We define a very restrictive understanding of privacy via combining definitions by Asokan et al., (1997 Asokan et al., ( , 2000 and Tsiakis and Sthephanides (2005) and refine it by introducing the term necessary minimum: An electronic payment system has to ensure privacy by limiting the visibility of transaction-related information to authorized parties involved in the transaction to the respective necessary minimum.
The necessity can hereby be given by technical, legal and other reasons (for example, as the possible necessity to be able to associate a payment to a payer and therefore showing the payer's name -though this name might be a pseudonym).
Experimental Setup for Privacy Analysis
To answer research questions 4 and 5 this paper seeks to identify the Interac e-Transfer related pieces of information which are visible to the parties involved in an e-Transfer as well as to potential eavesdroppers (as described in section 3.2). Accordingly, we perform a series of 22 Interac e-Transfers between bank accounts at The Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank), Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), and Bank of Montreal (BMO). This includes 12 Standard e-Transfers, 6 Autodeposit e-Transfers and 4 Request Money e-Transfers. The series is designed in a way to cover potential different influential factors (type of transaction, amount of transferred money, financial institutes of sender and recipient, TLS encryption, email/SMS, first and subsequent transactions, i.e. known and unknown email address or mobile phone number) in as few transactions as possible due to limitations regarding time, funds and other resources (see extended version of this report for details).
Results of Privacy Experiment
In the context of this paper, it does not seem to be helpful to apply complex private information measurement metrics, such as described in Wagner and Eckhoff (2018) , since the e-Transfer platform will not be compared with other systems. Instead, we will discuss general findings regarding the potentially observable Interac e-Transfer related information and which information would be interesting from the perspective of different types of adversaries.
The privacy experiment shows that e-Transfer related notifications and web pages (linked in the notifications and not requiring a login) in general contain many pieces of private information including financial information. The transmitted information varies the most depending on the type of e-Transfer as, for example, some information, only exists for certain types of e-Transfers. E-Transfers which are sent to mobile phones (Standard or Money Request) contain slightly less information, e.g. no recipient name for Standard e-Transfers. Additionally, it can be observed that subsequent (2 nd , 3 rd etc.) Standard e-Transfers and Money Request e-Transfers contain a link to the recipient's preferred financial institute, i.e. the financial institution on whose website the recipient logged in after receiving the previous e-transfer (request) to this e-mail address. As expected by the authors, neither the support of TLS encryption at the recipient's email server nor the amount of money transferred has influence on the type and amount of observable information. That is, there is no mechanism implemented which reduces the detail or amount of information in notifications sent to non-TLS-supporting email servers or in notifications about larger amounts of money.
The experiment's results show that some information varies slightly in its concrete form. The e-Transfer senders' and recipients' name format (custom/legal/both) depends on their respective financial institute. This is obviously due to different implementations of the XML based interface to the Interac e-Transfer platform, i.e. it depends on the information which is passed on by the financial institutions via the interface. Section 3.6 discusses some problems related to this finding.
Another observation is that not all e-Transfer related confirmations (though notifications) must be sent via email or SMS. The Royal Bank of Canada enables their customers to view some e-Transfer related confirmations within a private mailbox on their website.
A last general observation is that e-Transfer related notifications are always sent within 30 minutes or less which allows conclusions to be drawn about the bank time habits of the person being eavesdropped on.
The following considers the observable information from the perspective of each potential observer. 1. Intended recipients and senders in general can only see the information they need to know or already knew. However, two important exceptions are that the sender can see the recipient's legal name when sending an Autodeposit e-Transfer and that the recipient can see the sender's legal name when receiving a Request Money e-Transfer. Therefore, these types of transfers do not allow for anonymously/pseudonymously sending/requesting money (which a Standard e-Transfer in general allows, depending on the sender's financial institution name format). Additionally, the sender's financial institution is also unnecessarily revealed to the recipient. 2. Unintended recipients/observers (e.g. system administrator, roommate, spouse) can learn information which in the best case might be embarrassing for the sender or receiver ("Why did you pay x for/to y?"), but for example they might also learn information which would allow for blackmailing the intended sender or recipient.
Criminal individuals can use compromising information about previous money transfers for
blackmail. They can also search emails (e.g. on a server) for potentially interesting money transfers in order to redirect them (see section 3.4). Observing the banking time habits of the victim can help in doing so. 4. Criminal organizations/groups can do the same as criminal individuals but e.g. might have access to several email servers or many target devices. Additionally, they can use the information to forge customized phishing emails, as the observable information amongst other things contains information about people to/from whom money has been transferred, including names, financial institutions, amounts, preferred language etc. 5. Intelligence agencies can use the observable information to track money flows (including personal notification/confirmation messages regarding the purposes of transfers), e.g. to identify suspects or to observe their funding and expenses.
The tabular summary of the observable information is shown in Table 1 below and Table 2 in Appendix A. The detailed tabular representation of observable data is shown in Appendix B. 
Probable Reasons for Privacy Problems
Since the above clearly suggests that the e-Transfer related information can be unintentionally or purposefully misused for different unauthorized activities, the question arises why it is being sent at all? Based on our observation we tentatively conclude the following:
1. The process of the Standard e-Transfer and Request Money e-Transfer requires the recipient to perform an action (depositing the funds or authorizing to send funds). 2. This action requires the recipient to login to a financial institution. 3. Within the e-Transfer platform it is technically necessary to provide (and use) a custom link contained within the e-Transfer notifications to perform these actions. This creates the danger of phishing mails which mimic this type of email as can be seen from Appendix C. It can be assumed that the personal information contained in the notifications therefore has the purpose to show its legitimacy so that the recipient knows that the link is safe (and not a phishing link). Since this is achieved by showing secret knowledge about the transfer, we call this approach exposed knowledge verification. 4. Additionally, it can be assumed that including detailed information about the transfers is also convenient for the customers since they can track the status of e-Transfers without logging in to their financial institution's website. This would explain why detailed information is also contained in confirmations which do not contain the aforementioned custom links.
Section 3.7 will propose improvements to address these problems, namely the requirement of the custom link and the exposed knowledge verification as well as the convenient tracking of e-Transfer statuses.
Possible Attack Scenario Arising from Identified Privacy Problems:
The previous section shows that the information contained in Interac e-Transfer-related notifications can be misused for fraudulent and other criminal activities. In the following, a possible attack that could for example be carried out by a criminal group is described in more detail. 1. The group commits financial identity theft, as e.g. described by Aïmeur and Schönfeld (2011), by hijacking an individual's Canadian bank account. This might be easier than expected since e.g. the banks considered in this report (BMO, RBC, Scotiabank) rely on security questions for verifying new browsers (see Appendix D) which are shown to be insecure by Schechter, Brush and Egelman (2009). 2. The group eavesdrops on a larger number of email recipients, e.g. by compromising an email server, or many end user devices, specifically searching for Standard Interac e-Transfers of larger amounts of money. It can also observe the usual banking times of its victims in order to identify a good time for trying to redirect a money transfer. I.e. they have more time to figure out the answer to the security question at a time when the victim usually is not banking online. 3. They now open the deposit link in the e-Transfer notification and login to the hijacked bank account to see the security question. Depending on its kind and strength (see section 3.5.2), they can try to guess it or to research the answer in previous emails or social networks. Alternatively, they just might log the answer when the legitimate recipient answers the security question. In the case of a recurring payment with the same security question they know the answer for the next transfer. 4. When the group knows (see step 3 above) or correctly guesses the answer to the security question it can deposit the money in the hijacked account. 5. The deposited funds in the hijacked account can then be used for buying goods online or they can be forwarded to an international account. As long as the group quickly rebalances the funds in the account, the legitimate owner of the account might not even notice that activity. The sender of the e-Transfer will not notice the redirection (see section 3.6) and the original legitimate recipient will have to contact the bank/Interac to learn where the funds were deposited respectively to report the fraudulent activity. 6. The attacker group can continue this attack until the hijacked account is frozen. However, since the probability of detection will increase over time it can also decide to clear the account e.g. when reaching the daily maximum of e-Transfer deposits, which is usually CAD 10,000. Subsequently they can continue their attack with another hijacked account. Thus, they have increased their 'profit' by e.g. CAD 10,000 in comparison to only clearing the account (without using it for redirecting e-Transfers).
Experiment-Based Security Analysis 3.5.1. Definition of Security
Asokan et al. (1997, 2000) defined that besides confidentiality another common security requirement to an electronic payment system is to ensure integrity and authorization, i.e. -from an individual's perspective -that no funds are transferred from that individual's account without his/her authorization. The same can apply for receiving funds, e.g. to be able to reject unsolicited bribes (Asokan et al., 1997 (Asokan et al., , 2000 . Other security requirements are discussed by Sahut (2008), Asokan et al. (1997 Asokan et al. ( , 2000 and Tsiakis and Sthephanides (2005) but are out of this paper's scope. However, the next sections will show that improving the security of the Interac e-Transfer platform necessitates the definition of additional requirements (see section 3.7).
On the (in-)security of Security Questions
As described before, it is possible to see a Standard e-Transfer's security question when selecting the deposit link in an -e.g. eavesdropped -notification and logging in to the website of a financial institution.
I.e. the security is not provided by withholding the security question but by having to know the correct answer. Yet, Schechter, Brush and Egelman (2009) came to the conclusion that the "security of personal questions appears significantly weaker than passwords" (Schechter, Brush and Egelman, 2009, p. 386) . Therefore, we assume that it is often possible to guess or research the correct answer e.g. by searching previous mails which the sender sent to the recipient. RBC's pending patent for enhancing e-Transfer security similarly states that the "verification process can be weak if the challenge […] is based on information that […] may be discovered by a third party through a social media website or otherwise" (Lau et al., 2018, p. 2) .
Other authors also pointed out that the usage of security question often creates privacy problems, too: if actual private information is used for specifying security questions/answers, this information might additionally become public in the case of a security breach.
It is important to note that Schechter, Brush and Egelman (2009) examined security questions which would be used e.g. to verify someone's identity before resetting that someone's password. That means that their study considered security questions that did not serve to verify the legitimacy of a second individual -who also knows the answer to the security question -but only to verify the first individual itself. However, we argue that a security question and answer shared by two persons can only be as strong (or weak) or even weaker than any security question the two persons might create for authenticating themselves. This assumption is based on set theory: the set of security questions and answers which a person would want to share with a second person -or which the second person already knows -can only be a subset of both persons' personal security questions. More specifically, it will be the intersection of the two sets of previous knowledge-based security questions and the two sets of -for this purpose -made up security questions as shown in Figure 3 . When financial institutions like the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) provide pre-defined security questions, see CIBC (2017), the set of predominantly used questions might be even more limited. We think it would be interesting to empirically research these problems -especially regarding its potential implications for the security of Standard e-Transfers -but, like Schechter, Brush and Egelman (2009, p. 386), we prefer to suggest using an alternative authentication method, or to use an implicit authentication as described in section 3.7.
Experimental Setup for Security Analysis
The set up for the security experiment is similar to the privacy experiment in that we use the author's three bank accounts at BMO, RBC and Scotiabank to perform a series of 9 Standard e-Transfers. For this experiment, however, we always use the author's legitimate email addresses as sender addresses (instead of generic email addresses created for the privacy experiment). The legitimate recipients' names and email addresses are made up from common Canadian given names and last names. For a certain series of transfers, the legitimate recipient has the name of one of the authors (first author) and a specifically created email address which contains this author's name. Additionally, we use a mobile phone number that the author sending the related e-Transfers has not used before. All recipients email addresses were registered at an email forwarding service that does not support TLS for incoming mails.
The other important difference is that all transfers -except for one -are not deposited by these invented recipients -or the first author -but instead by the second author (into the second bank account owned by him) who hereby also takes the role of the attacker. Only one transfer is deposited by the first Figure 3 : Set of security questions that are shareable between sender and recipient author in order to suggest that this is his new "legitimate" email address -from the perspective of a fraud scoring engine. We simulated the eavesdropping of the attacker by simply forwarding the email and SMS notifications to him. Overall, we take care to correctly simulate the fraudulent activity, using different locations/IP addresses, devices and browsers for senders, intended recipients and the simulated attacker. The series of e-Transfers covers different sender accounts and money amounts (CAD 0.10 to CAD 1,900). It covers different numbers of failed attempts to correctly answer (what we consider to be) a weak security question. A sub-series of three transfers with a more complex security question/answer is deliberately failed to be answered correctly even in the fourth (last possible) attempt. After that, the sum of funds in these transfers is resent in a new transfer and then successfully redirected. This seeks to simulate an adversary who tricked the sender to resend the funds with the same question after having researched the correct security answer. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 4 .
Results of Security Experiment
Overall, the results of the security experiment confirm the authors' early observation -that it is possible to redirect Standard Interac e-Transfers to a third-party's bank account. Additionally, the results show that the amount of money being transferred or possible knowledge about previous deposits of the recipient do not influence this property, i.e. redirects are also possible for bigger amounts of money (verified up to CAD 1,900) and also for email addresses which have been used to deposit funds into another -legitimate -person's bank account before. It is also possible to redirect funds which have been sent to a mobile phone number, though we did not verify if it is possible to do that after previously depositing a transfer into the legitimate account (due to a limitation of available mobile numbers).
As described above, the experiment sought to also simulate more suspicious behaviour/patterns, e.g. by looking at security questions, failing to answer them, etc. Yet, this also did not influence the successful deposit into the simulated hijacked bank account. The detailed results of the experiment are presented in tabular format in Appendix E.
We additionally noticed that the sender of an e-transfer will not know that it has been redirected, since the confirmation message to the sender always contains the recipient name which the sender originally specified. The legitimate recipient will of course eventually notice that the transfer has been redirected because opening the deposit link shows that the transfer has already been deposited. He also might notice that the default link for the preferred financial institute changed when another transfer is sent to the same email address and the financial institution of the attacker is different from his financial institution.
However -as will be discussed in detail in sections 3.5.5 and 5 -one has to take into consideration that the redirectability might be an intended or tolerated undocumented feature and/or that the limitations of our experimental setup influenced the results. 
Reasons for Security Problems
In our opinion, the identified possibility to redirect Standard Interac e-Transfers and the described attack scenario is due to several platform-specific design decisions/properties. 1. Standard e-Transfers are not strictly associated with the legitimate recipient. 2. The platform mainly assumes that email/SMS are neither eavesdropped nor sent to unintended recipients, because in this case it is impossible to identify transfers of bigger funds, to open the deposit link, or to learn other sensitive information. 3. In the case that an eavesdropper/unintended recipient can read a notification, the platform relies on the security question being strong enough to keep them from depositing the funds. 4. The fraud scoring engine/proprietary risk management used by Interac Corp. (Interac Corp., 2018b , 2019a fails to identify the redirection of a transfer to an illegitimate recipient, e.g. based on the recipient's name. 5. At least some accounts at banks, who are participants in the e-Transfer platform, seem to be weakly secured against financial identity theft (hijacking of account), e.g. due to the usage of security questions. As previously mentioned, it is however possible that it is intended that consumers are able to redirect/forward e-transfers to other recipients: to the best of our knowledge, there is no policy stating that the name of the recipient must match the name which the sender specified for the recipient. It can be assumed that this would create issues e.g. seeing that senders might use nicknames or other name variations (including typos) when specifying the recipient name. Additionally, it is clearly intended that a recipient may choose into which legitimate account a transfer shall be deposited.
We are however sceptical that the redirectability/forwardability to another person is an intended feature since we did not find any related information.
However, if it is a tolerated property or even an undocumented feature, it -as the experiment showscan be misused for fraudulently redirecting transfers which should obviously be avoided. We therefore propose improvements to overcome this issue -and other issues -in section 3.7.
Additional Security Relevant Observations
1. The E-Transfer sender email addresses at Scotiabank and RBC are not verified before they can be used.
Therefore, notifications can get lost or sent to unintended recipients when incorrect email addresses are specified; similarly request notifications can show incorrect sender email addresses. 2. The initiation of e-Transfers at BMO, Scotiabank, and RBC do not have to be authorized individually e.g. using a second authentication method such as a transaction authentication number (TAN); the login authentication is sufficient. Authorizing each transfer would be less convenient but more secure. 3. It is impossible to reject an Autodeposit e-Transfer (at least at BMO, RBC, Scotiabank). This may lead to unsolicited bribery or to problems when someone specified the wrong recipient. Depending on the sender's financial institute, the recipient will not be able to see the sender's legal name. Additionally, the legal name can be ambiguous and the recipient might not know the sender. Since the sender email address is not shown to the recipient for this type of e-Transfer, it is difficult to contact the sender or to simply send the money back. 4. If a recipient has configured the Autodeposit feature for a certain email address, the sender will be shown the recipient's legal name (and depending on the recipient's financial institution also the profile name) after entering the target email address in the web interface. This is obviously in order to verify that the correct recipient has been specified, which, however, is very problematic: a. It is possible that showing the name is not sufficient but rather misleading, e.g. if the sender is not sure about the recipient's name and guesses that e.g. Michael Miller has the email address michaelmiller@domain.com although it actually was m.miller@domain.com. If a recipient with that email address (who registered that address for Autodeposit) exists, it is very likely that showing the legal name will misleadingly suggest that the correct recipient's address has been specified.
b. Showing legal names of Autodeposit recipients also does not allow for anonymously/pseudonymously receiving transfers via this e-transfer type. c. The interface might be misused for retrieving the legal name of a person for whom someone only knows the email address. Additionally, random email addresses can simply be tested e.g. to create tailored phishing attacks (using correct legal names). For testing, hijacked bank accounts could be used. We noticed that the interface at BMO, for example, allows for testing email addresses in quick succession but we did not test the limits of that. This problem might be researched in future worke.g. with experiments or examining the Interac e-Transfer API.
Proposed Improvements
The identified privacy and security issues -not all of them related to the redirection of transfers -can be overcome in different ways. Approaches include short-term implementable recommendations for Interac e-Transfer users and middle-to long-term implementable proposals to financial institutions, email providers, and Interac Corp. These approaches, however, do not address all problems so that we just outline them in the extended paper's appendix.
In contrast to this, as a first step, we propose additional requirements/properties that must be met by the Interac e-Transfer platform to overcome the identified privacy and security problems. That is because these problems originally result from certain properties and design decisions regarding the Interac e-Transfer platform as described in sections 3.3.4, 3.5.5 and 3.6. We propose the following requirements (here including explanations referring to the Interac e-Transfer platform). 1. Intrasystem security and privacy: The security and the privacy of the system must not rely on external systems (such as SMS or email) which are not under the service provider's (here Interac Corp.) control. Therefore, security and privacy must also not be based on a human component (such as a security question). Where the human factor has to come into play (e.g. when creating passwords), technological means must minimize the risk of unsafe system configuration and usage. 2. Transfer-directability: E-Transfers of all types have to be technically linked to a certain recipient, in order to ensure that it cannot be redirected to another recipient. The recipient may nevertheless have the option to choose a certain bank account. 3. Identifier-verification: The sender identifier (currently the notification email address) for all types of e-Transfers must be verified to belong to the person who wishes to use them before first use. This is in order to avoid accidental or intended specification of wrong identifiers. 4. Technical recipient identifier-verifiability: The recipient identifier (currently the target email address or phone number) for all types of e-Transfers must be verifiable regarding accidental misspecification. The verification should be based on a technical verification that does not expose personal information. At the same time, it should not expose information regarding whether a certain identifier does not exist or if it was incorrectly specified in order to avoid snooping of identifiers. 5. Transfer rejectability/returnability: Recipients of unsolicited e-Transfers must be able to either reject the transfer or -in the case of an Autodeposit -to return the transfer without needing to know the sender's identity. 6. Individual e-Transfer initiation, fund-withdrawal and device change authorization: An e-Transfer initiation, the withdrawal of funds from an account (via e-Transfer request) and device changes always have to be individually authorized with a one-time (password) method. 7. Minimum information disclosure: Notifications to e-Transfer customers sent via an unsecure channel must not contain any sensitive personal/financial information. Notifications sent via secure channels must not reveal unnecessary information, including banking times of e-Transfer users, to other users or third parties.
Based on the proposed additional requirements above, we propose several related improvements to the Interac e-Transfer platform that holistically address all identified problems and meet the desired properties as briefly discussed in the next section. The proposed improvements are described in detail in the extended paper but are also contained in Appendix F.
Evaluation
The main contribution of this report is the research into potential security and privacy issues related to the Interac e-Transfer platform and the proposal of additional requirements and improvements to address the identified issues.
We designed our experiments in a way that sought to avoid the results being influenced or biased by factors like the usage of known e-mail addresses, size of transferred funds, TLS support, sender and recipient financial institutions, usage of email or SMS, and first-time/subsequent transfer. Additionally, we verified or supported our assumptions regarding the potential observability of information by either technical means (e.g. regarding TLS support) or by reviewing relevant sources. Thus, we are confident that our privacy-related results are correct and in general apply also to other financial institutions participating in the Interac e-Transfer platform. Regarding our security related results, we consider them to be tentative findings, due to the given limitations in the experimental setup. For example, the accounts we used have at least some relation to each other: they are owned by the same person and/or have exchanged funds via legitimate transfers before (e.g. during the privacy experiment). This might have influenced the security related results, e.g. considering the possibility that Interac Corp. automatically detected suspicious behaviour in the accounts but did not take action after manually reviewing the matter. However, we consider this to be unlikely since we carefully sought to simulate real fraudulent behaviour. Thus, we would have expected Interac Corp. or our financial institutions to at least contact us in the case of its detection. Additionally, we did not notice any delayed transactions (taking more than 30 minutes). A manual review would probably have taken more time.
With regards to the proposed additional requirements (and improvements), we argue that it is possible to tentatively evaluate their validity by mapping the identified problems to requirements and improvements as presented in Appendix F. Future research can verify the approach via applying theoretical proof (see section 5).
Discussion, Conclusion & Future Research
This paper has identified and addressed problems of privacy and security of the Interac e-Transfer platform and thereby closed the gap created by the absence of earlier examinations into that platform. Our results show that under realistic assumptions -regarding the abilities of todays' eavesdroppers'-the platform fails to protect its customers' privacy due to design decisions which may well have been state-ofthe-art when the platform came into being. Nowadays, assuming the privacy and security of unencrypted emails and security questions is unacceptably risky. Additionally, the simulated attack's success shows that Standard e-Transfers are potentially insecure against redirections given that attackers invest enough effort to hijack someone's bank account, to identify transfers of higher values, and to research or guess the answer to security questions. Although the findings regarding security should be generally verified by future research, they are already supported by a recent news article by Johnson (2019) . Future researchers will probably have to obtain the consent of Interac Corp. in order to ensure that nonresearcher participants of more extensive experiments are not exposed to the risk of having their bank accounts frozen. Discussing the issues with Interac Corp. was unsatisfactory from our point of view (see section 6). Consequently, we have proposed a holistic approach to address both the privacy and security problems.
Further research could also be done to evaluate and compare today's Interac e-Transfer implementations by including more participating financial institutions, e.g. to identify potential inconsistencies, flaws (e.g. regarding the Autodeposit user interface), and other usability issues such as those documented in the extended report's appendix. It is also possible that some of the identified issues may be created or exacerbated by the respective implementations of the financial institutions.
Additionally, researching security questions as an authentication method between two parties would extend earlier research which examined security questions as an authenticating method for web logins (one party). This may support or reject our findings on the security of Standard Interac e-Transfers in general and in particular our set theory-based approach to applying these earlier results to this scenario.
Finally, we would be very happy to see other researchers evaluating our proposed improvements with theoretical approaches such as UML-based secure systems development (Jürjens, 2005) , or using our suggestions to propose their own alternative approaches. Either way, we hope to see real improvements in the Interac e-Transfer platform as soon as possible.
Epilogue
We contacted Interac Corp. the first time during the preparation of our initial report and again after we finished it and submitted it as a university course project. Interac Corp. reviewed it and provided feedback on June 3 rd , 2019 (Vaughan, 2019) . They criticized several aspects of our report, but from our point of view the critique is not fully applicable and, where it is, we argue that it does not influence the validity and correctness of the results. Nevertheless, we have taken the feedback into account in the version of the report presented in this paper. The review by Interac Corp. can be seen in the extended paper. We also added detailed comments regarding their review to that version. 
Appendix B
The following four tables show the information within each e-Transfer performed for the privacy experiment. Originally, the table is one piece but to show it here it is split up. The relevant descriptive columns are repeated for each part. The test plan and protocol for the experiment are contained in the experimental dataset (within the folder "Experimental Data"). 20 
Appendix D
The following screenshots show that BMO, RBC, and Scotiabank use security questions to verify the identity of users when they login from a new device or browser. 
